Patenting in China has been growing at an annual double-digit rate over
Introduction
Chinese patent applications have been growing at an annual rate of over 15 percent since 1986, the year following the reinstitution of China's Patent Law. The surge is not limited to patent applications from domestic Chinese inventors, which have increased by ten fold. Since China first amended its Patent Law in 1992, patent applications filed by foreign inventors have grown at an annual rate of 22 percent.
Nor is the surge confined to utility model and design patents that represent small and incremental innovations and that receive scant patent examination and limited legal protection. Following China's second amendment to its patent law in 2000, invention patent applications from both domestic and foreign inventors have grown at an annual rate of 23 percent.
China's remarkable patent explosion invites careful examination. A number of authors have observed a world wide surge in patenting, particularly that in the U.S. since the mid-1980s, patenting has been growing at an annual rate of six percent. This compares modestly with the magnitude of the Chinese patent explosion. Another and perhaps more striking feature of the dramatic upsurge in patenting in China is that it has taken place in a legal environment where intellectual property rights protection continues to be weak and the rule of law not well established. These weaknesses in China's patent system presumably lead to weak incentives to patent, which make the causes of the surge particularly challenging to unravel.
A confluence of events that have accompanied China's patent explosion also provide candidate explanations. China has twice amended its patent law by expanding the scope of patent protection, including the introduction of new mechanisms to enforce patent rights. The amendments have largely brought China's patent law in line with international norms. However, China's legal system, particularly the enforcement mechanism and the informal norms that are needed to support it, is far from effective in protecting private property rights. Piracy remains rampant. What might lead inventors to seek out patent protection when such protection could turn out to be ineffective?
The R&D intensity of China's economy, measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP, hovered around one-half percent for much of the 1990s before rising in the late 1990s, reaching 1.0 percent in 2000, and then continuing to climb to 1.35 percent in 2004. China is now one of the few low or low-middle income countries whose level of R&D intensity has risen beyond one percent (Hu and Jefferson, 2004) . One possible explanation of the surge is that China's rising R&D intensity may be creating more patentable new knowledge.
Also during the past decade, foreign direct investment of rising technological sophistication has been expanding into more Chinese industries and regions. As foreign invested firms expand and deepen their manufacturing activities in China, with some establishing R&D operations, the need to protect their intellectual property might also be expected to rise. Moreover, the use by foreign firms of legal weapons, now sharpened by the new pro-patent legislation, could be demonstrating to Chinese firms the strategic importance of patent rights. Therefore, in addition to the expansion of China's patent law and the growth of China's R&D intensity, a third hypothesis that potentially explains China's patent explosion is that the surge of FDI has raised the stakes for owning patent rights for both foreign and domestic firms thereby leading to a higher propensity to patent.
Differences in the inter-industry incidence of patenting are often associated with "complex" and "discrete" product industries. The former industries develop new products or processes that consist of numerous separately patentable elements versus relatively few patentable elements in the discrete product industries. As a consequence, firms in complex product industries typically build up portfolios of intellectual property rights in order to gain a competitive edge in licensing nego-3 tiations. A structural shift of Chinese industry towards more complex industries would lead to a higher incidence of patenting.
Finally, the Chinese government accelerated ownership restructuring of the state-owned enterprises in the mid-1990s. Legislative changes that affirm private property rights and institutional changes such as the withdrawal of local governments from many collectively owned enterprises have produced less ambiguous assignments of property rights in China's enterprise system. The increasing entry of non-state enterprises and the comparatively strong incentive of these enterprises to assert their property rights including those over intellectual property could also have contributed to China's patent upsurge.
We investigate and differentiate these hypotheses by nesting them in a patents production function, which we estimate using a data set that spans the population of China's large and medium sized enterprises from 1995 to 2001. These enterprises are responsible for the bulk of China's industrial R&D.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature that investigates the causes of the U.S. patent explosion. Section three describes China's patent system and the government's attempts to restructure it.
Section four provides summary evidence on the patenting behavior of China's large and medium size enterprises. We discuss the specification and estimation of the patents production function in section five. In section six we draw inferences for the different hypotheses of China's patent explosion based on the estimation results.
Section seven presents our conclusions and related discussion.
2 Patent explosion in the U.S. and beyond
The incidence of patenting has grown rapidly worldwide. The patent explosion in the U.S. has particularly been well documented and analyzed. Studies have pro-posed and examined a plethora of hypotheses that potentially explain the patent upsurge. Kortum and Lerner (1999) investigated three alternative hypotheses: the friendly court hypothesis, the fertile technology hypothesis, and the regulatory capture hypothesis. The first of these refers to a series of pro-patent legislative developments that may have increased the propensity to patent. In contrast, the fertile technology hypothesis is predicated on three conditions: the expansion of technology opportunities, particularly in industries such as biotechnology and information technology and software, higher productivity of innovation due to the applications of information technology to R&D, and innovation in the management of R&D that is characterized by a shift towards applied R&D activities. The third hypothesis -the regulatory capture hypothesis -maintains the pro-patent legal developments were driven by the efforts of large U.S. firms to weaken the competitive edge of domestic and foreign entrants. Using aggregate patent data from the U.S. and international patent data, Kortum and Lerner through a process of elimination concluded that the U.S. patent explosion has been primarily driven by "changes in the management of innovation involving a shift to more applied activities."
Combining information from interviews and with firm-level economic data, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) examined the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. firms in the semiconductor industry, which had not traditionally relied on patents as a means to protect its intellectual property and yet had seen a sharp rise in patenting since the mid 1980s. They found evidence of "patent portfolio races" among these semiconductor firms following the series of pro-patent legislative changes in the 1980s. Such races, they argued, were driven by the firms' incentive to enhance their bargaining position in the ensuing patenting licensing negotiations or patent litigations.
In a recent synthesis, Jaffe and Lerner (2004) analyzed how the seemingly innocent pro-patent legislative changes had turned patents from a means to encourage 5 innovation to a strategic tool that may well stifle innovation.
There is no consensus as to what is behind the U.S. patenting surge. Given the enormous inter-industry differences in technology opportunity and propensity to patent, it seems that there is room for both the fertile technology and the strategic patenting hypotheses in accounting for the patent explosion.
3 China's patent system and the patent explo- 1 The law helped to create a patent system that was similar to those used in Europe and Japan. China's patent office grants three types of patents: invention, utility model and design patents. Applications for invention patents need to pass a substantive examination for utility, novelty, and non-obviousness before the patents can be granted. The utility model and design patents generally cover more incremental innovations and are not subject to examination for novelty and an inventive step. Finally, like the systems of Europe and Japan, China's system is based on the first-to-file principle rather than the first-to-invent principle.
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The first major amendments of China's Patent Law came into effect January 1, 1993. The amendments extended the scope of patent protection to cover pharmaceutical products, food, beverages, flavorings, and substances obtained by means 1 The origin of patent legislation in China can be traced to a prototype of patent law entitled the Charter of Rewards on Invigoration of Industry and Art the Qing Dynasty promulgated in 1889.
2 Like Europe and Japan, China's patent law also includes a pre-grant opposition system under which parties can file a request with the patent office to object to the grant of the patents concerned.
6 of chemical processes. The duration of invention patent protection was extended from 15 to 20 years, while that of utility model and design patents increased from 5 to 10 years. Protection for manufacturing processes has been extended to products that are directly obtained by the patented process. Also, a patentee has the right to prevent any other person from importing the patent related product. The grounds for granting compulsory licenses were restricted. The pre-grant opposition was replaced by a post-grant revocation procedure -as a result, the entire process of patent approval was shortened by an average of six to ten months. In accordance with TRIPS requirements, the amendments provide patent holders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction against the infringing party before filing a lawsuit. The new law also stipulates standards, not previously existing, to compute statutory damages. The amendments affirm that state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal treatment in obtaining patent rights. The amended law simplifies the patent application, examination and transfer procedures and unifies the appeal system by removing the patent revocation procedure that had also served as the invalidation procedure.
The patent explosion
The incidence of both patent applications and grants surged in 2000, although prior to that there was a small blip in 1993 after the first Patent Law Amendment.
3 Over the years China has also joined a number of international conventions for IP protection. 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Source: authors' own tabulation using the LME data.
industries.
In 1995 Source: authors' own tabulation using the LME data. Source: authors' own tabulation using the LME data. Source: authors' own tabulation using the LME data.
14 percent of total value added. As foreign firms broaden their manufacturing activity in China, increasing their share of local production, the risk that their technologies will be imitated increases.
Various authors have contrasted complex and discrete products industries in explaining inter-industry differences in patenting. 6 Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) described the key difference between the two kinds of technologies as "whether a new, commercializable product or process is comprised of numerous separately patentable elements versus relatively few." A consequence of this feature is that firms in complex product industries usually do not control all of the patented technologies used in the manufacture of a product. Firms patent to build up a portfolio of intellectual property rights in order to gain a competitive edge in licensing negotiations. Hall (2004) suggests that "in complex product industries, firms are more likely to use patents to induce rivals to negotiate for property rights over complementary technologies." We select beverage, textile, chemical, and pharmaceutical to represent the discrete product industries and special machinery, transport equipment, electric machinery, and electronics for complex product industries. Firms from complex industries are twice as R&D intensive as those from discrete industries. They file for more three times as many patent applications and appear to be more capital intensive. Their industries also attract more foreign investment.
5 What is behind China's patent explosion?
In search of an explanation: five hypotheses
We have identified five hypotheses with respect to China's patent explosion. The pro-patent amendments to the Patent Law in 1992 and 2000 may have raised the overall return to seeking patent protection. The intensification of R&D in the Chinese economy has channeled more resources into innovation activities that may have led to patentable technologies. International economic integration, particularly the vast inflow of foreign direct investment, has raised the stakes for protecting intellectual property rights in China for foreign firms. It has also raised the return to patenting for domestic Chinese firms that can use patents as a strategic tool to counter competition from foreign-invested firms. Inter-industry differences, particularly differences in the incidence of patenting between complex and discrete product industries, and changing industrial structure may also raise the overall incidence of patenting. Economic reform, which has strengthened private property rights and accelerated the exit of inefficient state-owned firms and entry of nonstate enterprises, has produced more non-state enterprises that are seeking patent protection more aggressively than before.
The patents production function: specification and estimation issues
Following the tradition of Pakes and Griliches (1984) , Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) , and Bound et al. (1984) we estimate a patents production function, which assumes that patents production follows a Poisson process with parameter, λ:
Where Y is the count of patents of firm i in year t, the vector X includes R&D expenditure, firm characteristics that influence knowledge production and propensity to patent, year dummies to capture the overall trend of propensity to patent, and industry characteristics that explain inter-industry differences in patenting.
The majority of firms in our sample do not do R&D and even fewer take out patents. This results in a large number of zero observations for patent counts. The large number of zero observations raise two concerns. First, the large number of zeros leads to a non-normal distribution, which biases the estimates of standard errors. More importantly, these zero observations possibly result from two quite different data generating processes: firms that do not innovate at all and those that attempt to innovate but fail to generate patents. The economic significance of the two types of zeros is quite different. We choose to model the two processes explicitly and separately by adopting the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model proposed by Lambert (1992) . We assume that firms in our sample fall into two categories, the innovators and the non-innovators. Let the likelihood of a firm being a noninnovator be p; the probability of a firm being an innovator is therefore 1−p. With probability p, a firm's patent count will be zero; with probability 1 − p, the patent count will be subject to the Poisson process in equation (1). The full model is therefore specified as follows:
We further assume that the decision to innovate is determined by a logistic process with F being the logit link:
In Z are variables that determine whether a firm chooses to innovate or not. The likelihood function to be maximized is therefore:
More general models of this type include the hurdle model of Mullahy (1986) .
Crepon and Duguet (1997) also considered a more general model that involves latent processes, of which the zero occurrences are realizations. Vuong (1989) proposed a test to determine whether there is a regime splitting mechanism at work or not in the ZIP model. We report the Vuong test statistics after estimating the ZIP model of equations (1) to (4).
Another issue that requires econometric treatment is firm heterogeneity. The variables we include in X it may not capture all the firm specific characteristics that determine a firm's innovation and patenting decision and behavior. To the extent that some of these characteristics influence a firm's R&D decision, the patents-R&D elasticity estimate would be biased. For example, more capable and motivated managers may decide to conduct more R&D and be more forceful in maintaining a portfolio of patent rights. To the extent that such characteristics are time-invariant, we use the fixed effect Poisson model developed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) . This model corrects for the bias that may be introduced to the patents production function estimates by the omitted firm-specific characteristics.
Exploring the five hypotheses
Assuming that a constant proportion of new knowledge generated can be transformed into patents, the production of which is given by equation (1), the first variable we consider to include in X it is R&D expenditure. In the absence of guid-
ance from a theoretical model, we follow the tradition of the literature and enter R&D expenditure in the patent production process in logs, therefore implicitly assuming a proportional relationship between R&D and patents. Estimating the elasticity of patent production with respect to R&D and comparing it with that obtained for U.S. firms allows us to gauge the innovative efficiency of Chinese firms.
We also include the square of the log of R&D to account for possible non-linearity in the relationship between R&D and patents production.
Although the debate over the relationship between firm size and innovation in the spirit of Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) is far from settled empirically (Cohen and Levin, 1989) , we control for the scale effect from firm size on patents production by including the number of employees that are not involved in R&D activities in the regression.
We then include a number of firm specific and industry specific variables to investigate the sources of the increase in the propensity to patent in Chinese firms.
Given the time span of our sample, we can only use year dummies to identify the effect on propensity to patent of the 2000 amendment to the patent law.
We measure the presence of foreign direct investment in China's 3-digit industries by the share of industry value added accounted for by foreign invested firms.
We use value added instead of sales or employment since the latter may be subject to bias due to industry variation in capital intensity. The status of foreign invested firms is determined by the National Bureau of Statistics depending on its ownership form at the time of registration. The statistical authorities distinguish between foreign investors who are from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT) (i.e. "overseas" firms) and those from other locations (i.e. "foreign" firms).
The surge of FDI in China has multiple implications for the patenting behavior of both domestic Chinese firms and foreign firms operating in China. As foreign firms deepen and expand their activity in China, the need to protect their existing intellectual property against domestic Chinese firms will rise as well as the need to compete with other foreign firms in China by introducing more sophisticated products and technologies. The aggressive enforcement of patent rights by foreign invested firms may demonstrate for domestic Chinese firms the strategic value of holding patents. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese firms are taking advantage of loopholes in the Chinese patent system in order to use patents to preempt competition from foreign firms. 7 Utility model and design patents are particularly vulnerable to such abuses as they are not subject to substantive examination for novelty and inventiveness. Our data does not distinguish between invention patents and utility model and design patents. We are therefore unable to exploit the potential differences in the motivation to apply for utility model and design patents.
7 In a New York Times article (French, 2005) , a Chinese intellectual property rights lawyer was quoted as saying "Once upon a time, the counterfeiters in China ran away when you came after them. Today, they don't run away. Indeed, they stay put and they sue us. More and more Chinese companies are taking a so-called legal approach, taking advantage of serious weakness in the Chinese legal system." Some Chinese firms exploit loopholes in the patent system by takeing out a patent ahead of their foreign competitions in China and sue them for violating their patent rights. The time over which the legal battle will be dragged on would give Chinese firms sufficient time to exploit the copied technology particularly in industries with short product life cycles.
On the other hand, by embodying more sophisticated technology than domestic firms, increasingly establishing R&D operations in China, and through various channels of diffusion such as personnel turnover and demonstration effect, FDI could effect knowledge spillover to the firms in its vicinity. We are unable to separate analytically the effect of knowledge spillover and the strategic behavior inducing effect of FDI.
8 Instead we try to gauge the relative importance of these effects in the context of patents production, where we control of other inputs to knowledge production, and by comparing the magnitudes of the effect with the estimates of knowledge spillover in the literature.
The industry variation in technology opportunity and nature of technology makes it imperative to account for not just industry heterogeneity in the propensity to patent but also the knowledge production process itself. In addition to estimating an aggregate patents production function, we also estimate the individual patent production function for eight two-digit industries that have been most active in patenting. In particular, we are interested in investigating whether there is a discernible difference in the propensity to patent between complex and discrete industries.
China's enterprise restructuring in particular has given rise to a spectrum of ownership structures that include state ownership, local collective ownership, publicly-listed firms with majority of equity controlled by the state, private enterprises, foreign wholly owned and joint ventures. This gamut of ownership types in turn carries different implications with respect to the assignment of property rights. Patents taken out by state-owned enterprises belong to the state, unless the patents are a result of an inventor's effort outside his/her official duty. The two amendments to the Patent Law have clarified and affirmed the entitlement to intellectual property by non-state enterprises. We therefore expect the propensity to patent to vary across ownership types. As in the case of FDI, there is also a potential efficiency effect on knowledge production from ownership reform.
Non-state firms may enjoy an increase in the efficiency of knowledge production due to the incentive structure in these firms. Including the ownership dummies in the presence of the control for the economy-wide year effect allows us to capture differences in the propensity to patent beyond what is induced by the legislative changes as well as the efficiency effect.
That state-owned enterprise restructuring have accelerated the exit of inefficient state-owned enterprises and the entry of non-state enterprises produces yet another implication for the patent surge. To the extent that non-state firms are more assertive of their patent rights, the changing ownership structure of Chinese industry must have led to even higher incidence of patenting.
6 Estimation results and discussion
Accounting for the patent explosion
We try to unravel China's patent surge paradox by analyzing the results from estimating the patents production function that are presented in Table 2 . The number of patent applications measures the output of patents production. Our discussion below is based on the results using patent applications because patent grants data are missing for the last two of the seven years covered by the sample.
However, we have estimated the models in Table 2 using patent grants. The results are consistent with the results in Table 2 and are available upon request.
We use real R&D expenditure as a proxy for innovation input. A number of authors have noted that R&D expenditures are highly correlated over time and usually the association between R&D expenditure and patents production exists only at the contemporaneous level. 9 Therefore current R&D expenditure is used to estimate the patents production function. We follow this approach after experimenting with distributed lags of R&D expenditures and finding past R&D expenditures insignificant in explaining patents production. Another practical concern is that our sample is extremely unbalanced. Including a comprehensive lag structure would require us to drop a large number of observations. So would the effort to construct a knowledge stock using historical R&D expenditures. Therefore we settle for using R&D expenditure as a determinant of patent counts.
The first two columns of Table 2 We will return to these alternative estimates in the section of robustness check. Therefore, we base our discussion and conclusion on the ZIP results.
Has the patent upsurge been driven by R&D?
The R&D intensification of the Chinese economy together with the increasing patents-R&D ratio makes innovation a prime candidate explanation for the patent explosion. However the the patents -R&D elasticity estimate is not only small 9 For example, see Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001) by OECD standard; also suggests that R&D intensification is unlikely to be the primary driving force of the China's patenting boom. The ZIP estimation result in column(2) of Table 2 implies a patents-R&D elasticity of 0.066 when evaluated at the sample median level of real R&D expenditure, which is zero. The patents-R&D elasticity will be 0.3 if we evaluate the elasticity at the sample mean of the real R&D expenditure. This larger magnitude no longer represents the "typical" firm's patents-R&D elasticity since the distribution of R&D activity is highly skewed in our sample and is likely to be driven by the few extremely innovative firms -an issue we will return to below. Even this most optimistic estimate of patents-R&D elasticity is much smaller than similar estimates for the U.S. and European firms. (2000) reported an elasticity estimate of 0.9 for German firms.
The much smaller elasticity estimate could have been caused by either low productivity of R&D in Chinese firms or that Chinese firms patent a much smaller fraction of new knowledge generated by R&D than their OECD counterparts.
Given the increases in patent applications and real R&D expenditure from 1995 to 2001, a patents-R&D elasticity of 0.3 would imply that R&D intensification had contributed to 24 percent of the patenting increase, leaving the bulk of the patent explosion unexplained.
Foreign direct investment and patenting
The impact of industry FDI on patenting is large. Column (2) of Table 2 We then estimate the patents production function separately for domestic and foreign invested firms to examine whether the patenting behavior of foreign and domestic firms reacts differently to industry FDI. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) A noticeable difference between foreign and domestic firms is in the patents -R&D elasticity estimate. While foreign firms' Chinese patents are only loosely related to their R&D activity in China, R&D makes a significant contribution to patenting production among Chinese firms. This result affirms the general perception that the R&D of foreign firms in China has more to do with local customization than with generating new technologies and that the surge in foreign patent applications in China may largely take the form of seeking Chinese legal protection for foreign firms' existing patents invented elsewhere. Another possibility is that the Chinese subsidiaries of multinationals may file for Chinese patent applications on behalf of their parent companies. In the meantime we are unable to rule out the possibility that the Chinese subsidiaries assign their patents to their parent companies. In other words, the patented technologies are locally invented but the property rights of the patents may be assigned to parent companies.
Finally, column(4) shows that patenting by foreign invested firms assumed greater urgency after 2000, more so than domestic Chinese firms. This is likely to be a result, that is the combined effect of foreign firms' anticipating China's entry to the WTO and the amendment to the patent law in 2000 that sharpened the teeth of patent rights enforcement in preparation for signing the TRIPS treaty.
As we have noted earlier, we are unable to differentiate the propensity to patent and the knowledge spillover effect of FDI. However, an examination of the findings of the literature on knowledge spillover of FDI indicates that the magnitude we obtain for the effect of FDI is simply too large to be rationalized by the spillover effect. Aitken and Harrison (1999) , for example, found a negative impact of industry FDI on domestic firms' productivity. Two more recent studies on OECD countries obtained modest estimates of the spillover effect of FDI. Haskel et al. (2002) reported for UK industry a 0.5% increase in TFP for 10% increase in industry FDI. Keller and Yeaple (2003) showed that in the U.S. a 10% increase in industry FDI leads to a 5% increase in TFP for domestic firms; and for Canada, 1% increase in TFP for 10% increase in industry FDI. Our estimate of the industry FDI coefficient is an order of magnitude larger than those cited here. Clearly our results suggest a potentially large role for the strategic behavior interpretation of the effect on Chinese domestic firms' patenting of industry FDI.
Non-state enterprises vs. state-owned enterprises
The propensity to patent varies considerably across ownership categories. We compute the marginal effect of ownership using the dummy estimates from both the normal Poisson and ZIP models and plot it in Figure 8 . All the dummies are precisely estimated except that for jointly-owned enterprises, whose propensity to patent is similar to that of the reference group, state-owned enterprises. All nonstate enterprises but the jointly-owned group have a higher propensity to patent than state-owned enterprises thereby confirming our conjecture that ownership Source: authors' own tabulation based on estimates in Table 2 .
reform and pro-patent legislative changes have resulted in more clear property rights assignments, which have led non-state firms to more aggressively assert their intellectual property rights. In the non-state sector, collective-owned and private enterprises have been most aggressive in applying for patents. There is little difference between the propensity to patent between foreign invested firms and Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan invested firms.
Since the mid 1990s enterprise restructuring has picked up speed, so that both exit of state-owned enterprises and entry of non-state enterprises have accelerated.
This evolution of the structure of the ownership of Chinese industry is depicted in Source: authors' own tabulation.
together with the more assertiveness of the non-state enterprises in patenting can be expected to contribute substantially to the patent explosion. We quantify the effect as:
where s i,t refers to ownership group i's share of total units of LMEs in year t and d i denotes the ownership dummy estimates we obtain in column (2) of Table 2 .
The total effect works out to account for 7 percent of the total patent surge among
LMEs from 1995 to 2001.
Patent law amendments in 2000
The economy-wide propensity to patent as measured by the year dummies in Ta Naturally we cannot attribute all of this to the amendments of China's patent law.
Another interesting observation that we commented on briefly before is the noticeable differences between the year effects for domestic and foreign firms. To the extent that foreign firms have stronger R&D capabilities and larger stocks of intellectual property, they stand to benefit more from stronger patent rights.
Therefore the differences in the year effects indirectly corroborate the proposition that the propensity to patent has increased as a result of stronger patent rights.
Complex vs. discrete industries
We select four complex industries and four discrete industries to examine how inter-industry differences may have contributed to the patent explosion. The complex industries are special machinery, transport equipment, electric machinery, and electronics; the discrete group consists of the beverage, textile, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries. To gauge the group specific propensity to patent, we compute the mean and standard error of the average of the four industry dummies from each group and report them as complex and discrete in Table 2 . That is, after estimating the industry dummies, which we did not report in column (2), we use them to construct the mean and standard error of the average of the dummies for the four industries from each group.
Other than in the normal Poisson estimation, where standard errors are biased, we cannot find any difference in the propensity to patent between the complex and discrete industries. However, this does not mean that the complex-discrete distinction is inconsequential. As we will see in the industry level regressions, there is a stronger patents-R&D link in the Chinese complex industries, which are also more R&D intensive. To the extent that complex industries might grow faster than discrete industries, the changing composition of industrial structure would lead to a higher incidence of patenting. But such an effect would have been absorbed in the patents-R&D link.
Finally, we also find a quite robust firm scale effect, represented by the labor variable, on patenting. The scale elasticity hovers around 0.3, which is slightly lower than the typical finding in the OECD literature. Large firms take out more patents because there are economies of scale from preparing patent applications and potential scale economies in conducting R&D.
Robustness check 6.2.1 The innovators
Compared with their mature market economy counterparts, Chinese industries are fragmented. A high degree of heterogeneity among Chinese firms means that highflying innovators operate along side technology laggards. Such firm heterogeneity is reflected in the highly skewed distribution of R&D and patents. We take a close look at these innovators in this section.
We define innovators as firms that have more than one year's representation in the sample and have been granted at least one patent over the seven years. This innovators subsample leaves us with 4514 firms and 22598 observations. Summary We first re-estimate the patents production function for the innovators using the ZIP estimator and report the results in the first column of Table 3 . They are very similar to what we obtained using the full sample.
To account for firm heterogeneity, we then re-estimate the patents production function using two panel estimators: Poisson fixed effect and random effect. Both estimators generate broadly consistent results, although the Hausman test unambiguously rejects the random effect model suggesting that the firm specific effect is not uncorrelated with the included regressors in the patents production estimation. Most of the results that we obtained previously with the full sample carry through. The Poisson fixed effect estimate of the patents -R&D elasticity, between 0.04 and 0.10, depending on whether we evaluate it at the median or mean of R&D expenditure, is smaller than that for the average LME. The squared R&D variable has seen the biggest reduction in magnitude reflecting the much smaller variation in the scale of R&D operation among the innovators. The effect of industry FDI, at one third of its previous magnitude, remains robust. Unlike the results in Table   2 , the propensity to patent of the innovators has been steadily increasing over the years, albeit with the same jump in 2000.
We then estimate the patents production function for domestic and foreign firms separately using the Poisson fixed effect estimator. There is now a sharper contrast between domestic and foreign firms. The previously found weak link between R&D and patents in foreign firms has become non-existent. In the full sample estimation, both domestic and foreign firms increase their patenting in response to a higher concentration of FDI in their industry with the latter's reaction slightly smaller than the former. However, a comparison of the domestic and foreign innovating firms shows that patenting among foreign innovators does not respond to industry FDI at all, while domestic innovators' patent applications remain strongly correlated with industry FDI intensity. with the non-existence of a patents-R&D link, this shows that foreign firms' patenting in China largely takes the form of patenting existing intellectual property that they created elsewhere. The rapid increase of such patenting is likely to be driven by both the change in the legal environment of patent protection in China and the lure of the Chinese market at a time when China further liberalized its economy and integrated more closely with the global economy.
Patents production at the industry level
Given the inter-industry heterogeneity in technology opportunity and the relative importance of the means to protect intellectual property, we estimate the patents production function separately for the eight complex and discrete industries and report the results in Table 4 . This set of estimates allows for a more careful examination of the differences between complex and discrete industries.
The weak patents-R&D linkage carries through to the industry level with marked differences along the complex-discrete line. The R&D coefficient is insignificantly different from zero in all four discrete industries; the R&D square term is significant in textiles and only marginally significant in chemicals. In stark contrast, all the complex industries demonstrate a statistically robust patents-R&D link with the only exception being transport equipment. All regressions include ownership and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets * -significant at 95% level; ** -significant at 99% level
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We do not find any systematic differences with respect to the other estimates.
The finding of higher patenting rates in FDI intensive industries applies to three industries: chemicals, transport, and electric machinery. The effect of FDI intensity in the chemicals and electric machinery industries is particularly prominent with magnitudes that are larger than the coefficient we obtained using the full sample. The scale effect is most pronounced in the beverage, pharmaceutical, electric machinery, and electronics industries.
In sum, the results in Table 4 show that the driving force behind the patent surge varies from industry to industry. The electric machinery industry is in some sense a "perfect" industry that encapsulates all the driving forces we have identified. In the other industries, one factor or another stands out as the dominant explanation of the patenting surge.
Concluding remarks
China's patent explosion has taken place in an institutional environment that is not known for the rule of law and rigorous protection of intellectual property rights.
Such institutional deficiencies should have substantially weakened the incentives for inventors to apply for patents. This seeming paradox has prompted this investigation of the conditions that are motivating the rapid growth of patenting in China.
A confluence of events coincide with the patent explosion. The continuing surge of FDI in China, pro-patent amendments to China's patent law, China's entry to the WTO, the deepening of enterprise reform that realigns incentive structures, and above all, the intensification of R&D in Chinese industry emerge as candidate explanations of the patent boom.
We use a data set that spans the population of China's large and medium size A robust result is the rather small estimate of the incidence of patenting with respect to R&D, at least by OECD standards. The patents-R&D link is particularly weak among foreign invested firms. The phenomenon of increasing R&D intensity explains less than a quarter of the patent upsurge in our sample. This result leads us to conclude that China's recent R&D intensification is unlikely to be the primary force behind the patent explosion.
We have found that foreign direct investment significantly contributes to the To the extent that we can associate at least some of surge in the incidence of 38 patenting in 2000 with China's pro-patent legislation, a more patent-friendly legal environment emerges as an important explanation of China's patenting boom.
Clearly, China's patent explosion has not been detonated by any single event.
Opening up, deepening economic reform, and a relatively stronger legal system have together created a more patents-friendly environment and have increased the return to patenting. An issue that the data does not allow us to address is differences between invention patents and the less innovative utility model and design patents. These distinctions in the form of patenting are important to understanding the nature of patenting activity in a developing economy; it is on our future research agenda.
